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Summary. The UK economy has enjoyed an unprecedented period of positive economic growth
since the early 1990s. The absence of recession for more than a decade has been accompanied by
a sustained decline in the level of mortgage arrears, as reported by major lenders. This paper
seeks to examine the factors which have driven the reduction in mortgage arrears and, in doing
so, identify those factors which are most likely to cause arrears to increase in the future, should
economic conditions deteriorate. The paper employs the Johansen methodology to test for the
presence of multiple cointegrating vectors. An error correction model is estimated in order to
examine long-run and short-run dynamics in mortgage arrears. In line with previous research
concerning the causes of mortgage arrears, the results presented here emphasise the importance
of changes in the rate of unemployment, loan–income and debt–service ratios. More
importantly, our results highlight the statistical signiﬁcance of unwithdrawn housing equity as
an explanatory variable with respect to mortgage arrears.
1. Introduction
According to ofﬁcial statistics for the UK,
more than 389 000 properties were possessed
by lenders between 1990 and 1996, which
affected more than 1 million individuals
(Council of Mortgage Lenders, 1997). Posses-
sions are invariably the result of an extended
period of ﬁnancial distress during which indi-
viduals and households have accumulated
arrears. This paper seeks to examine those
factors which inﬂuence the aggregate level
of arrears on the mortgage book of a number
of major UK banks and building societies.
The UK housing market has experienced
considerable turbulence since the early
1980s (Ford, 1997). The market has witnessed
several periods of rapidly rising house prices,
such as occurred between 1982 and 1989.
However, between 1990 and 1992, a sharp
downturn in activity was reported, resulting
in a dramatic reversal in house price inﬂation.
Since 1992/93, the UK economy has enjoyed
a period of steady growth, accompanied by a
sustained decline in unemployment and a
strong rise in earnings. As a consequence,
the market has again reported record increases
in average house price inﬂation across the UK,
originating in London and the South East
region, with the consequent ‘ripple effect’
northwards. This latest boom has renewed
fears that the UK housing market is again
overheating, thereby increasing the prob-
ability of another crash similar to that experi-
enced in the early 1990s. It is in this context of
a sustained house price boom that the level of
mortgage arrears has signiﬁcantly decreased,
as accounted for by the UK major lenders.
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DOI: 10.1080=00420980500231670This paper seeks to examine the variables
which have driven the reduction of mortgage
arrears and, in doing so, identify those
factorswhicharemostlikelytocausethissitu-
ation to reverse should conditions in the UK
economy deteriorate in the future. We
examine the path of mortgage arrears in the
period from 1993 to 2001, based on a unique
database compiled from the detailed proﬁle
ofborrowersfromaconsortiumofmajormort-
gage lenders. In the context of our analysis, it
should be noted that we are only concerned
with arrears involving mortgages for a speciﬁc
sub-section of the UK housing market—
namely, the owner-occupied sector; we are
not concerned with arrears involving rents in
the public and private sectors.
The remainder of the paper is organised as
follows. Section 2 presents the past and
more recent developments in the UK
housing market in order to put the study
reported here into context; section 3 examines
the pattern of mortgages, mortgage arrears
and mortgage possessions since the mid
1980s; section 4 describes the framework
which we employ to model mortgage arrears
and a description of the data; section 5 sets
out the econometric methodology, while
section 6 presents and discusses the empirical
results. Finally, section 7 summarises and sets
out the main conclusions of the paper.
2. Developments in the UK Housing
Market
The structure and nature of the UK housing
market are the result of a trend which has
seen the proportion of personal-sector wealth
held in the form of owner-occupied dwellings
increase dramatically over many years.
Owner-occupied dwellings accounted for
approximately 40 per cent of the net wealth
of the personal sector in 1990 compared
with around 20 per cent in 1960. The UK
has one of the highest owner-occupation
rates in the world and one of the lowest
levels of private renting. In 1991, 68 per
cent of households were owner-occupied,
whereas this was a mere 10 per cent in 1914
(Miles, 1993). The period 1981–89 saw a
rapid growth in the number of home-owners
from 11.9 million to 15 million and the
number of mortgage holders grew from
6.2 million to 9.1 million households
(Maclennan and Gibb, 1993).
The early 1980s saw a sharp downturn in
housing market activity, with house prices
remaining almost static in 1980 and 1981.
1
This stagnation has to be placed in an histori-
cal context. A Conservative government came
to power in 1979 with an agenda which
encouraged home-ownership (Moore, 1992).
Two speciﬁc areas of government policy
were central to the growth of home-
ownership. First, a ‘Right-to-Buy’ policy
saw 1.45 million properties transferred from
the ‘social rented’ sector to the private
owner-occupied sector between 1980 and
1992.
2 At the same time, deregulated ﬁnancial
markets generated a highly competitive ﬁnan-
cial environment (Coakley and Harris, 1992)
as well as the end of credit rationing (Michie
and Wilkinson, 1992). This policy, and
the liberalisation of ﬁnancial markets in the
1980s, the Financial Services Act 1986 and
the Building Societies Act 1986 (Harrington,
1996), were key drivers of the turbulence in
the housing market in the late 1980s and
early 1990s.
Increased competition between lenders
resulted in borrowers being able to acquire
loans which were a greater percentage of
the value of their properties and a higher mul-
tiple of their incomes. This resulted in house-
hold-sector mortgage indebtedness increasing
from less than 25 per cent of annual disposa-
ble income in 1980 to around 75 per cent in
1992 (Brookes et al., 1994). The average
mortgage advance increased from 46.1 per
cent of the house price in 1980 to a peak of
60.1 per cent in 1986, remaining at 58 per
cent for the rest of the 1980s. For ﬁrst-time
buyers, the average advance increased from
73.8 per cent of the house price in 1980 to a
peak of 84.4 per cent in 1988 (Council of
Mortgage Lenders, 1994).
The combination of increased demand for
housing, due to rising incomes, and increased
competition to supply mortgage lending
fuelled house price inﬂation. According to
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average, by over 4.5 per cent per annum
during the 1980s, with nominal house price
inﬂation peaking at 28 per cent in 1988. As
house prices increased, borrowers increased
their gearing and those at the lower end of
the income scale with no deposit were
amongst the most highly geared borrowers.
Accelerating property prices also increased
the equity which many long-term borrowers
have in their property. By 1989, it was esti-
mated that 24 per cent of borrowers had
extended their loans and drawn down the
equity in their property values.
However, the price inﬂation generated by
the ‘Lawson Boom’
3 of the late 1980s
(Coakley and Harris, 1992)
4 led to the inevita-
ble adoption of a restrictive monetary policy
and a tightening of interest rates—with mort-
gage rates doubling during a 16-month period
from September 1988 to January 1990,
peaking at over 15 per cent.
The combination of a restrictive monetary
stance and the ensuing economic recession
of the early 1990s caused the housing
market to weaken considerably—nominal
house prices across the UK fell, on average,
by around 7.5 per cent between 1990
and 1992 which was unprecedented in the pre-
vious 40 years (Council of Mortgage Lenders,
1994). The severity of the decline in house
prices was also matched by the longevity of
the slump in the housing market. Real prices
declined by 6.25 per cent per annum from
1989 to 1994 and by a further 2.5 per cent in
1995 (Pain and Westaway, 1997). A signiﬁ-
cant number of households found themselves
in the position where they were unable to
meet their mortgage repayment schedules
and they fell into arrears, ultimately resulting
in an increased level of possessions by
lenders, up from 16 000 in 1989 to 75 500 in
1991 (Malpass and Murie, 1999).
Borrowers in arrears came from a wider
spectrum of home-buyers than had previously
been the case in terms of age, occupational
status and family composition. Job losses
due to redundancy, small business failure
and reduced earnings were the major triggers
of arrears. Retrospectively, lenders were
perceived to have responded slowly to the
growth of arrears, only securing the earlier
intervention contact and assessment after a
period of time.
Ortalo-Magne ´ and Rady (1999) argue that a
sustained growth in incomes and a relaxed
credit constraint for younger borrowers were
critical in explaining the boom in the 1980s
property market. They further argue that the
negative credit market shock, which the UK
mortgage market experienced in the late
1980s and early 1990s, was a unique event
and was unlikely to be repeated.
3. The Pattern of Mortgage Arrears
The impetus for the research we report in this
paper stems from the observed pattern of
mortgage arrears in the UK housing market
since the mid 1980s. In the past, ﬁnancial
institutions typically developed a ‘score
card’ methodology to predict future reﬁnan-
cing problems on the part of mortgage bor-
rowers. Such an approach seeks to identify a
series of trigger events that are associated
with mortgage arrears. By the late 1990s,
this score card approach systematically
overestimated the actual level of arrears. The
observed behaviour of mortgage data gener-
ated a second concern—namely, that the inci-
dence of arrears had shifted from its long-run
equilibrium level. In the context of these
recent developments, this paper develops an
econometric model in order to assess the
extent to which the incidence of mortgage
arrears has diverged from its long-run equili-
brium level and how swiftly it may return to
that level.
As can be seen from Figure 1, the number
of mortgages granted in the UK increased
steadily over the period considered in this
paper (1985–2001). Nevertheless, since
1993, the number of mortgages in arrears
has decreased signiﬁcantly, along with the
number of possessions (Figure 2), despite
the 1995 changes to the entitlement to
welfare beneﬁt concerning mortgage interest
5
and growth in the mortgage payment protec-
tion insurance (MPPI).
6 Later in the paper,
empirical tests provide evidence of the fact
MORTGAGE ARREARS IN THE UK 1757that the above factors did not contribute to
structural breaks over time in the model
presented.
Three main factors appear to be responsible
for the decline in the number of mortgage
arrears and possessions. First, after the
‘boom and bust’ of the late 1980s and early
1990s, it may be argued that banks and build-
ing societies have improved their procedures
for measuring the risk associated with supply-
ing mortgages to different types of borrowers.
This, therefore, has equipped them with a
greater depth and reﬁnement of information
for assessing lending risk and the probability
of mortgage default. Secondly, it may also
be argued that borrowers have become better
informed and more cautious about choosing
particular mortgage products than previously.
Finally, competitive pressures have resulted in
many ﬁnancial institutions nowadays offering
low-margin mortgages (Harrington, 1996).
7
The outcome is that customers have become
less loyal to lenders, more discerning about
ﬁnancial products and, hence, more active
in searching for the best-value offerings in
the market, resulting in reduced monthly
Figure 1. UK mortgages, 1985–2001. Source: Housing Finance, Council of Mortgage Lenders.
Figure 2. Mortgages in arrears and possessions. Source: Housing Finance, Council of Mortgage Lenders.
1758 CATARINA FIGUEIRA ET AL.mortgage payments for many, as suggested by
Aoki et al. (2001).
As a result, the negative impact of the abol-
ition of tax relief on mortgage interest
on house prices, housing consumption and,
ultimately, home-ownership was offset by
changes in borrowers’ behaviour and house-
hold leverage, as claimed in Hendershott
et al. (2002).
8
With respect to the analysis of mortgages in
arrears, three main periods are normally con-
sidered: 3–6 months in arrears, 6–9 months
in arrears and over 12 months in arrears.
Figure 3 shows that mortgages in arrears
follow the same pattern in the three periods
analysed.
It will be seen that the general pattern of
mortgages in arrears increased sharply from
the end of 1989 to 1992. Thereafter, the
number of arrears has been in a downward
trend. This has been in tandem with a steady
decline in the national level of unemployment
in the UK, which has reached historically low
levels. Moreover, the nature of this unemploy-
ment has tended to be primarily short-term
(so-called frictional unemployment), further
contributing signiﬁcantly to the decrease in
arrears.
However, the number of mortgages in
arrears for 3–6 months seems to be more
volatile than the number of mortgages in
arrears in the other two periods. This is due
to the fact that many borrowers will typically
attempt to delay the payment of their mort-
gage instalments for a few months, when
they are faced with what they perceive to be
temporary changes in their net income and/
or expenditure. In such circumstances, mort-
gagors will rectify the delay in paying their
instalments without any major action being
taken by the ﬁnancial institutions concerned.
Moreover, many mortgage borrowers make
use of the net asset value contained in their
property—i.e. the property value minus the
outstanding value of the mortgage (referred
to as ‘unwithdrawn equity’)—and, as a conse-
quence, negotiate new contracts with the bank
or building society.
The housing literature identiﬁes a number
of particular factors in the explanation of the
dynamics of mortgage arrears. The levels of
unemployment and redundancies are ident-
iﬁed as key drivers of the aggregate level of
arrears by Doling et al. (1988) and Ford
et al. (1995), while Brookes et al. (1994)
identify increased inﬂows into unemployment
as an important factor. The relationship
between the age of the head of household
and arrears has been also examined by Ford
(1993) and Nettleton and Burrows (1998). In
Figure 3. Mortgages in arrears: 3–6, 6–9 and over 12 months. Source: Housing Finance, Council of
Mortgage Lenders.
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evidence that the younger the head of the
household, the greater the probability of
experiencing arrears. Furthermore, Bo ¨heim
and Taylor (1999) suggest that the increased
incidence of periods of unemployment experi-
enced by younger workers explains their
increased propensity to experience mortgage
arrears.
Several US studies have also emphasised
the importance of equity on mortgage
default, such as Jackson and Kaserman
(1980) and Williams et al. (1974). Case
et al. (1995) claim that periods of high
default rates on home mortgages in the US
are closely associated with a decrease in
unwithdrawn equity, derived from decreases
in real estate prices. The following framework
investigates these relationships.
4. Modelling Framework and Data
4.1 Modelling Framework
The theoretical model presented in this paper
stems from earlier research by Wadhwani
(1986), which examined the frequency of
corporate bankruptcies. Brookes et al. (1991)
were the ﬁrst to apply Wadhwani’s theoretical
framework to the analysis of mortgage
default. This original framework has been
further developed by Breedon and Joyce
(1993) and Brookes et al. (1994). The model
is based on the assumption that an individual
and/or household who can afford to buy a
house chooses to buy instead of renting, as
long as such a choice results in higher net
returns. In other words, the individual wishes
to maximise the expected utility
E(U) ¼½ 1   u(:) ½H(d   w)  ½ cu(:)  (1)
where, u is associated with the probability of
mortgage payment difﬁculties; H is the
amount of housing services; d is the net
return associated with home-ownership (after
subtracting mortgage payments and other
debt costs, as well as maintenance costs); w
is equivalent to the rent that the occupier
would pay for the same house; and c
represents costs that would be incurred if pay-
ments started to be in arrears.
In the model speciﬁed by equation (1), H is
treated as a continuous variable because we
assume that it also depends on the size of
the house and its features; c includes the
cost of paying mortgage instalments late and
respective consequences (such as difﬁculty
in obtaining housing or loans from then
onwards). Therefore, c is assumed to be posi-
tively related to H.
The model is initially based on two further
assumptions: there is no inﬂation and ﬁrst-
time buyers are able to obtain more ﬁnance
only if the value of the property (VP)i s
higher than the mortgage debt (MD). The
individual or household may incur mortgage
payments difﬁculties when
Y   LC   rM þ (VP   MD) , 0 (2)
where, Y is disposable income; LC stands for
other living costs; r is interest rate paid; and
(VP   MD) represents unwithdrawn equity.
Therefore, the probability of going into
arrears can be represented by the following
function
u(:) ¼ u(Y, LC, r, VP   MD) (3)
The situation becomes more complex when
we take into consideration the effects of
inﬂation. If the value of mortgages is
indexed to inﬂation, then the model remains
unchanged (if borrowers have contracts with
a variable mortgage rate). Nevertheless, if
this is not the case and lenders refuse to
provide borrowers with new loans, then bor-
rowers will be in arrears when
(Y   LC   rMD) , 0 (4)
A further extension to the model is to incor-
porate the case when income, living expenses
and interest rates rise at a rate of p, while the
mortgage stock remains constant. In this case,
the real rate r is constant. Using the Fisher
condition, we can write r as (r þ p þ rp)
and the individual or household will be in
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(1 þ p)½Y   LC   rMD   pMD
=(1 þ p)  , 0 (5)
The above equation shows that when inﬂation
increases, borrowers face an additional
payment of pMD=(1 þ p).
When inﬂation and interest rates move in
tandem, if inﬂation increases then the bor-
rower’s debt–service ratio also increases and
this has an important impact on those bor-
rowers with high loan–income ratios. This,
as a consequence, increases the likelihood of
mortgage arrears.
This may, however, be counterbalanced by
the extent that house prices also increase and
borrowers release (unwithdrawn) equity in
order to meet mortgage instalments. If this
happens, then debt service as a percentage of
the borrower’sincome may remainunchanged
and hence the borrower will be in arrears if
(1 þ p)½Y   LC   rMD þ (VP   MD) 
, 0 (6)
In practice, due to costs such as transaction
costs, borrowers can only increase their loan
by a proportion of the unwithdrawn equity
which puts some additional strain on
payment difﬁculties. Under these conditions,
the probability of arrears will be a function
of the above variables, including the extra
monthly payment required, which may
produce income shocks. The unemployment
rate (UR) as well as aggregate income (Y)
are probably the most widely used measures
to account for these shocks. There are other
factors such as age of borrower, relationships
and administrative problems, which have an
impact on arrears; however, they are difﬁcult
to measure at a macroeconomic level and
hence they have been excluded from this
model.
9 In addition, it is difﬁcult to obtain
an accurate measure of other living costs,
and hence we use the loan–income ratio for
ﬁrst-time buyers (LY) as a proxy, since for
most ﬁrst-time buyers, mortgage debt pay-
ments reﬂect, by far, the largest element of
household expenditure, as claimed by Stein
(1995).
10 Finally, we use the debt–service
ratio (DS) to capture the burden and risk
associated with the increased debt mortgage
repayment. The probability of arrears can
then be written as
u(:) ¼ u(Y=pc, UR, VP
  MD, r, LY, DS) (7)
where pc is the consumer price index.
An important point to consider in this
model is that only unanticipated inﬂation
should have an impact on the borrower’s
mortgage payment difﬁculties, which means
that, in the long run, the level of inﬂation
does not affect arrears, even though short-
term changes in inﬂation do.
4.2 The Data
We use monthly data for England and Wales
only, for the period May 1993 to April 2001.
It is important to note that we have excluded
data for Scotland due to the fact that there
is evidence that the trends in the housing
market in Scotland and the rest of the UK
have differed substantially.
11 This may be
due to the fact that the court system for
arrears and possessions operates differently
in Scotland. Moreover, the structural timing
of the transition from renting to home-owner-
ship also differs between Scotland and
England and Wales.
12
For the purpose of this study, most of the
data were provided by a group of mortgage
lenders. The sample constitutes approxi-
mately 36 per cent of the total mortgage
book in the UK for the period under investi-
gation, which is sufﬁciently large to be
representative of the whole population. The
remaining data have been obtained from
the Ofﬁce for National Statistics (ONS) and
the Ofﬁce of the Deputy Prime Minister
(ODPM).
The dependent variable in our model is the
number of arrears in excess of 3 months on
the mortgage book (ARR) as a proportion of
the total mortgages (M) and is presented as
ARRM. The variable M includes both repay-
ment and endowment mortgages.
13 Data on
the unemployment rate (UR) are taken from
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obtain an accurate measure of living expenses
(beyond mortgage instalments), the loan–
income ratio for ﬁrst-time buyers (LY)i s
used here. The ratio of mortgage interest pay-
ments to real personal disposable income
measures household mortgage debt–service
ratios (DS). The level of unwithdrawn equity
(UNW) is calculated by the difference
between the current value of the mortgaged
housing stock minus the outstanding stock of
mortgage lending as a proportion of the stock
of mortgage lending
UNW ¼
(M   MAHP)   OSML
OSML
where, M is the current stock of mortgages
(number); MAHP is a mix-adjusted house
price; and OSML is the outstanding stock of
mortgage lending (value). The variable
MAHP was obtained from Ofﬁce of the
Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM).
Data have also been provided by lenders on
mortgage interest rates (RM) at which most
mortgage business was written. Real personal
disposable income (RPDI) data are from the
ONS.
5. Methodology
The methodology used in this article pursues
the following structure: initially, we examine
whether the variables investigated have one
or more unit roots; we specify the VAR
order and determine the number of cointe-
grating vectors. Finally, we present a
dynamic model of mortgage arrears, based
on the long-run determinants of mortgage
arrears.
5.1 Unit Roots Tests
We primarily investigate whether the vari-
ables described above are stationary or
whether they have one or more unit roots.
We use three tests to look at the dynamic




15 and a test by Im et al.
(1997) which uses panel data.
The main difference between the ﬁrst two
tests lies in the fact that Phillips and Perron
carry out a non-parametric correction to the
ADF statistics. However, the critical values
for this test are the same as those for the
ADF test (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997). The
variables are presented both in levels and in
differences. The statistics presented regarding
the order of augmentation of the Dickey–
Fuller test are based on the Akaike infor-
mation criterion (AIC) and correspond to an
alternative adjusted form of R
2, with a
different trade-off between goodness-of-ﬁt
and parsimony (Kennedy, 1998). The AIC
minimises ln(SSE=t) þ 2k=t, where ln is the
natural logarithm, SSE is the error sum of
squares, t is time and k represents the
number of explanatory variables.
A way to examine whether the series as a
whole is stationary (which many researchers
claim to be more relevant) is the one devel-
oped by Im et al. (1997). While the ADF
test is regarded as considerably more powerful
than other unit root tests, its power decreases
with smaller samples for the alternative
hypothesis H1: d ¼ d0 , 1, when d0 is near
unity. This does not seem to be a problem in
the case of the Im, Pesaran and Shin (IPS)
test because it uses panel data, as well as
with the fact that a large number of obser-
vations is present. Moreover, the simple
ADF test regards the size–power trade-off as
dependent on the order of augmentation.
This again does not constitute a problem in
the IPS test.
The IPS test is based on the average of the
individual unit root t-statistics and, in its most
generalised version, which accounts for poss-
ible serial correlation between the disturb-
ances in the Dickey–Fuller regressions, it
takes the following form




{  tNT(p, r)   1=N
PN
i¼1




i¼1 Var½tiT(pi,0 ) jbi ¼ 0 
q
(8)
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and tiT(pi, ri) corresponds to the individual t
statistic for testing bi ¼ 0 in the following
ADF (pi) regressions





where i ¼ 1, ..., N; t ¼ 1, ..., T.
The values of E½tiT(pi,0)jbi ¼ 0  and
Var½tiT(pi,0)jbi ¼ 0  are reported in Im et al.
(1997), evaluated via stochastic simulations.
5.2 Lag Speciﬁcation
In order to implement the Johansen maximum
likelihood approach to test for cointegration, a
general (unrestricted) vector autoregressive
(VAR) model is formulated. This summarily
consists of regressing each variable in the
model on all the other variables, lagged a
number of times—i.e. we allow the time-
path of one variable to be affected by current
and past realisations of some other variable’s
sequence and vice versa. The number of lags
in the VAR system is then speciﬁed, based
on the Akaike information criterion (AIC).
5.3 Cointegration Tests
Engle and Granger (1987), Johansen (1988)
and Johansen and Juselius (1992) have devel-
oped a methodology centred on cointegration.
The technique of cointegration evolves
around the idea that certain variables
“should not diverge from each other by too
great an extent, at least in the long run”
(Granger, 1991, p. 65). In other words,
although the variables are non-stationary,
they can be combined together into a single
series which is itself stationary.
There are currently two main approaches to
the problem of testing for cointegration: one is
referred to as the residual-based approach and
is based on the augmented Dickey–Fuller
(ADF) test of cointegration; the other is
Johansen’s maximum likelihood approach.
The latter is employed in this paper as it
appears to be more reliable and efﬁcient,
especially when more than two I(1) variables
are involved, as is the case of the present
study. It speciﬁcally provides a framework
to test for cointegration within the context
of a vector autoregressive (VAR) error
correction model.
The Johansen maximum likelihood pro-
cedure is based on a process of n I(1) variables
in an (n   1) vector X as an unrestricted
regression
Xt ¼ A1Xt 1 þ A2Xt 2 þ   
þ ApXt p þ 1t (10)
where, t ¼ 1, 2, ..., T; p represents the
number of timelags and 1t is an independently
and identically distributed n-dimensional
vector with zero mean and variance matrix P
1. In addition, A is a (n   n) matrix of par-





piDXt i þ pXt p þ 1t (11)
where,











I is the identity matrix. The rank of p is equal
to the number of independent cointegrating
vectors (r) which exist between the variables
in X. It can be obtained by testing for the
number of characteristic roots of p that are
signiﬁcantly different from 1. Johansen
(1988) demonstrates that this can be
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ltrace(r) ¼  T
X n
i¼rþ1
ln(1   ^ li) (12)
lmax(r, r þ 1) ¼  T ln(1   ^ lrþ1) (13)
where ^ li are eigenvalues and T is the number
of usable observations.
Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius
(1990, 1992) provide the critical values of
both statistics, which have been generated,
using simulation studies.
Once we have the number of cointegrating
vectors, we then obtain estimates of the coin-
tegrating coefﬁcients (together with their
asymptotic standard errors), which show the
long-run relationships between the variables
considered. Because, at this stage, we will
have proved that the variables involved in
this process are cointegrated, the deviations
of the dependent variable (in this case, the
ratio of arrears over 3 months and outstanding
mortgages – ARRMt) from its long-run path
ARRMt
  are stationary.
5.4 A Dynamic Model of Mortgage Arrears
The next step is to develop a model in ﬁrst





biDxit þg yt 1  
X n
i¼1
ai  xi, t 1
 !
þ1t (14)
where, y is the dependent variable (ARR/M); x
represents each of the explanatory variables; b
and g are the coefﬁcients of the explanatory
variables in the equation; a is the estimated
coefﬁcient of each of the independent vari-
ables in the long-run relationship; 1 is the
error term of the equation, i represents
the number of explanatory variables in the
model; and t is the time-period.
Therefore, the estimation of a spurious
regression because of the presence of possible
stochastic or deterministic trends in the data is
not a possibility. The model presented above
is composed of a long-run solution and has
an ECM(yt   y 
t ) when its coefﬁcient g is
negative.
6. Empirical Results
In this section, we present the estimated
results, based on the model set out above, as
well as the different steps which constitute
the methodology of this study.
Table 1 reports the results of unit root tests,
developed by Dickey and Fuller and Phillips
and Perron, on the levels and ﬁrst differences
of all the variables incorporated in the analy-
sis. Note that all the variables are in natural
logarithms. The results indicate that all
the variables are integrated of degree one—
i.e. they are stationary when in ﬁrst
differences. The only exception is the debt
service ratio (DS) which, according to the
Phillips–Perron test, appears to be stationary
in levels.
Therefore, it is important to look at all the
variables as a dataset per se and determine
whether the panel is stationary or whether it
has a unit root. The results of the IPS C  t test
is 218.8812, which is signiﬁcantly above
the critical value of 22.27 (in absolute
terms) at a 99 per cent conﬁdence level.
16
Indeed, the test statistic provides evidence
that the series as a whole is stationary when
the variables are in differences. Due to this
fact, it is highly probable that the variables
are cointegrated with each other.
The next step is to decide on the appropriate
number of lags to be considered for all
equations in the VAR. According to AIC
and SBC, the order of the unrestricted VAR
is equal to two.
Based on the results obtained above, cointe-
gration tests are conducted in a multivariate
framework. The results are reported in
Table 2. The trace and maximal eigenvalue
tests provided similar results; they reveal
that cointegration is supported among the
group of variables considered.
Taking the above results into consideration,
what follows is the respective cointegrating
1764 CATARINA FIGUEIRA ET AL.vector. This shows the long-run relationship
between the ratio of arrears of more than 3
months to the number of outstanding mort-
gages (the dependent variable) and the expla-
natory variables—see Table 3.
The estimated results imply that the prob-
ability of arrears is a positive function of
unemployment, the loan–income ratio for
ﬁrst-time buyers and the debt–service ratio
and a negative function of unwithdrawn
equity.
The long-run relationship between arrears
and unemployment is as we might expect
and conﬁrms the ﬁndings of a number of pre-
vious studies. Furthermore, the behaviour of
the LY and DS variables is also consistent
with our a priori expectation that an increased
loan–income value for ﬁrst-time buyers and/
or debt–service ratios increase observed
arrears. The role of unwithdrawn equity as a
long-run explanatory variable of arrears has
not been examined in previous research on
UK mortgage arrears. We have speciﬁcally
addressed this variable here and our long-run
equation suggests that an increase in unwith-
drawn equity has a relatively large impact in
reducing arrears.
17
The resulting dynamic equation based on
this cointegrating vector is shown in
Table 4. It is obtained by ordinary least
squares. The equation ﬁts the data reasonably
well. In addition to a signiﬁcant cointegrating
vector at the 1 per cent level of conﬁdence,
the equation includes growth terms in the
Table 1. Unit root tests
ADF test PP test
Variables Levels Differences Levels Differences
lnARRM 21.3305 29.6494   21.1728 229.2557  
lnUR 20.1949 27.7904   0.0532 27.1000  
lnRPDI 20.8382 27.1535   0.7320 29.2687  
lnLY 22.0442 28.2056   22.2073 211.3818  
lnUNW 21.1742 29.0296   21.2785 274.5768  
lnDS 22.3019 26.5044   23.9169   —
lnRM 22.7368 25.5007   21.6888 25.7246  
  Statistically signiﬁcant at the 95 per cent level of conﬁdence (95 per cent critical
value for ADF and PP statistic ¼ 22.8963).
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Table 2. Multivariate cointegration tests



















Notes: Period ¼ 94 observations from 1993M7 to 2001M4;
order of variance ¼ 2.
MORTGAGE ARREARS IN THE UK 1765unemployment rate, real disposable income,
unwithdrawn equity and the mortgage rate.
We have also included a dummy variable in
order to capture the combined effect of
changes to social security entitlement and
increases in mortgage protection insurance
(denoted SSMPI). As can be seen from
Table 4, our estimate of the short-run relation-
ship suggests that changes in UNW, RM and
UR explain short-run movements in arrears.
The coefﬁcient of changes in RPDI is
negative as expected, however, it is not
signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level of signiﬁ-
cance. Finally, changes in SSMPI that took
place in 1995 proved statistically insigniﬁcant
in the explanation of the dynamics of
arrears.
18
The estimated equation has a high R
2 and
the t-statistics and remaining diagnostic
statistics are robust which shows that the esti-
mates presented are efﬁcient.
7. Conclusions
This paper examines the factors which have
driven the reduction in mortgage arrears in
the period 1993–2001 for England and
Wales. By using cointegration techniques,
the results conﬁrm the primacy of unemploy-
ment rates and unwithdrawn equity as expla-
natory variables of mortgage arrears.
In the long run, the loan–income ratio for
ﬁrst-time buyers and the debt–service ratio
are also consistent with the existing literature
and affect mortgage arrears positively.
However, they do not have an effect on
arrears in the short run.
In a departure from previous studies,
unwithdrawn housing equity exhibits signiﬁ-
cant explanatory power. The importance of
unwithdrawn equity, not surprisingly,
appears to be a long-run rather than a
short-run phenomenon, suggesting that the
existence of unwithdrawn equity signiﬁcantly
reduces the extent of housing arrears. Three
main reasons seem to underpin this result.
First, unwithdrawn housing equity is acting
as a proxy for a buoyant housing market
and, in a booming housing market, we
would expect mortgage arrears to be lower.
Secondly, if the individual or household has
a certain amount of unwithdrawn equity,
he/she has the option available to sell the
property and trade down. Thirdly, unwith-
drawn equity may be used when remortga-
ging the property, in order to avoid going
into arrears. These results may suggest that
mechanisms should be put in place to
promote the use of index-based futures and
options in real estate in England and
Wales, as suggested by Case et al. (1995)
following their investigation of the US
housing market.
The ﬁndings consider the housing market in
England and Wales as a whole. This study
does not allow for regional variations, as this
needs much fuller investigation than has
been possible in the paper. Therefore, further
research could usefully build on the ﬁndings
presented above and focus on the regional
dimension of the national housing market
with respect to the causes of mortgage
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 Statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 per cent level of conﬁ-
dence;    statistically signiﬁcant at the 1 per cent level of
conﬁdence.
1766 CATARINA FIGUEIRA ET AL.arrears, as well as the differences from region
to region.
Notes
1. As described by Ford (1997), during the
1980s, many borrowers lost their property
as a result of mortgage arrears and, ulti-
mately, possession of their property, which
led to a signiﬁcant increase in homelessness.
2. Since 1979, the dominant housing policy
was the promotion of owner-occupation
and, consequently, the national housing
stock owned by local authorities was
reduced dramatically (Atkinson et al., 1987).
3. Nigel Lawson was the Chancellor of the
Exchequer from June 1983 until October
1989.
4. The ‘Lawson boom’ is associated with the
peak of the ﬁnancial system’s expansion
during the 1980s, which was reﬂected in an
unsustainable credit expansion and inﬂation
of house prices.
5. These changes were motivated by the need
to increase tax revenue which was lost
by the changes in welfare entitlement
(Devereux and Lanot, 2003) and the fact
that the expenditure was distorted towards
higher-income households, as suggested by
Hendershott et al. (2002).
6. For more information on the 1995 changes in
the social security and the MPPI policies, see
Kemp and Pryce (2002).
7. The 1986 Building Societies Act widened
the powers of these ﬁnancial institutions
and,as aconsequence, they started diversify-
ing their activities and competing openly
with banks on interest rates.
8. The deductibility of home mortgage interest
for tax purposes has been examined by
Woodward and Weicher (1989) and Follain
and Malamed (1998).
9. This paper deals with monthly data for
England and Wales on mortgages and mort-
gage arrears and not with microeconomic
information on individual borrowers.
10. Stein (1995) argues that, in the case of the
US, owner-occupied homes represent the
equivalent of approximately 27 per cent of
household net worth. As a result, he states
that “an exogenous shock to house prices
can have a large and broad based impact
onhouseholdliquidity”(Stein,1995,p.381).
11. Even though the study of regional effects in
the UK housing market is not the purpose of
this paper, the level of arrears as a percen-
tage of total mortgages does not seem to
vary considerably across the various
regions of the UK. Mortgages which are at
least 3 months in arrears constitute approxi-
mately 1–3 per cent of the total amount of
mortgages across the 12 regions in the UK.
12. We thank anonymous referees for their
useful comments on the differences
between the housing market in Scotland
and the rest of the UK.
13. It should be noted that the dataset used here
does not allow us to distinguish between
repayment and endowment mortgages.
However, it is important to note that the
amount of endowment mortgages has
decreased from around 60 per cent of the
total amount of mortgages in 1993/94 to
5 per cent in 2002, as a result of the beneﬁt
changes in 1995. According to Devereux
and Lanot (2003), following the changes in
tax relief, the gap in costs between repay-
ment and endowment mortgages narrowed
and therefore the additional risk associated
with endowment mortgages made this type
of mortgage increasingly unattractive to
borrowers.
14. For a thorough explanation of this test, see
Fuller (1976).
15. This test is described thoroughly in Perron
(1988).
16. See previous section on testing for unit roots
in panel data.
17. Data on consumer credit were used in the
initial equation which models mortgage
arrears but consumer credit proved to be
insigniﬁcant as an explanatory variable and
was therefore not included in the ﬁnal set
of results. These results are available from
the authors, at the reader’s request.
18. We have tested for collinearity between
lnUNW,l n LY and lnDS using two different
methods: correlation matrix and regression
of each of these variables on the other two.
Both methods showed that the three vari-
ablesabove arenot collinear.The correlation
between lnUNW and lnLY is 0.43, 0.15
between lnUNW and lnDS and 20.45
between lnLY and lnDS. The R
2 of each of
the three equations is 0.33 for lnUNW, 0.40
for lnLY and 0.04 for lnDS.
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